The UK Ministry of Defence posts website advice in relation to a possible accident (known as the
Local Authority & Emergency Services Information – LAESI).
Annex C of the current version of the guidance outlines an emergency response, led by the MoD with “off-site” co-ordination by the civil police, involving other Category 1 Responders as appropriate.
The detonation of the high explosive in a warhead or warheads would have an impact radius of 600 metres and could lead to the distribution, as fragments or as an aerosol, of toxic radiological materials including plutonium,
which is deadly if ingested. This effect requires sheltering and/or evacuation in a five-kilometre
area, depending on wind direction.
How Does This Affect Local Authorities?
Category 1 Responders, including local authorities, have a duty under Part 6 of the Civil
Contingencies Act (2004) to warn, inform and advise the public about possible emergencies or
guidance on what to do in the event of any emergency.
This duty also applies to the threat of a nuclear warhead convoy accident.
Best guidance on public information indicates the need for “pre-event” information as well as advice and information if an emergency is imminent or has occurred. Pre-event information is in fact offered to the public in relation to the radiological hazards associated with the nuclear weapon bases on the Clyde and in the neighbourhood of other nuclear establishments.
To our knowledge no Scottish local authority affected by the weapon traffic has in recent years informed the public of the risks and remedial actions required. The Civil Contingencies Act allows two exemptions to this duty – the requirements of “national security” and the need to avoid unnecessary public alarm. For consistency the national security exemption would also apply to the Clyde bases.
The information about the transport is openly posted on the UK government’s website, including a list of the local authority areas affected by the transport. The existence of the transport is now widely known among the public and reports, photos and videos of the weapon convoys is shared openly on social media platforms.
It’s time for local authorities to take a proactive public information approach to the threat rather than remain passive and hope for the best.
Annex C of the LAESI guidance has the MoD offering advice to the police in the heat of the incident who would then have the task of communicating with a wholly unprepared public. As regards “unnecessary alarm” it should be noted that public panic is more likely if there has not been adequate “pre-event” information and guidance. In the case of a distribution of toxic radiological materials poor public preparation could lead to problematic public responses such as inappropriate “self-evacuation”.
We accept that an incident leading to a detonation of high explosive and a release of toxic radiation is unlikely but we do know that such an incident would be utterly catastrophic. This means that the risk must be recognised as severe.
Indeed, the MoD itself acknowledges the gravity of the risk but maintains that the need to operate what it calls the UK’s “strategic deterrent” renders that risk acceptable. It is surely unthinkable that a local authority would take the additional risk of not informing its public in advance of any incident. The pandemic has surely taught us the dangers of inadequate preparation on the basis of a hope that the worst will not come to pass.
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