Impact of the decision to renew Trident on devolved matters

(This report is also availalbe as a Word document)

The UK Government’s decision to renew the Trident nuclear weapon system will have a substantial impact in Scotland over the next half century. The Scottish Government has a duty to investigate the impact that this decision will have on devolved matters.

The Concordat between Scottish Ministers and the Secretary of State for Defence says:

“The Secretary of State for Defence undertakes to inform the Scottish Ministers of all relevant draft legislation, executive functions he proposes to exercise, and policy developments in sufficient time for the policy and practical implications for devolved matters to be examined and representations made as appropriate”. [1]

The Scottish Government has a duty to consider the impact that this decision will have on devolved matters and to convey its opinion to the Secretary of State for Defence.

On 4 th December the Ministry of Defence (MoD) and Foreign Office published a White Paper on “The Future of the United Kingdom’s Nuclear Deterrent”. In this the Prime Minister stated “We have therefore decided to maintain our deterrent system beyond the life of the Vanguards with a new generation of ballistic missile-carrying submarines. We will also extend the life of the Trident D5 missile.” [2]

The White Paper says that three or four new submarines will be built. Each will be armed with intercontinental ballistic missiles and 48 thermonuclear warheads. The new submarines, missiles and warheads will be based at Faslane and Coulport from 2024 until around 2055.

This decision will have a substantial impact on matters devolved to the Scottish Parliament. It will affect civil defence, emergency planning, the environment, policing, the courts, prisons, the economy, fishing, tourism and the obligation to comply with international law. Expenditure on nuclear weapons will also have an impact on the Scottish budget.

This is an interim report outlining these issues.

Civil Defence and Emergency Planning

The deployment of nuclear weapons and nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarines in Scotland for the next 50 years will significantly increase the risk of a nuclear emergency. This could take one of three forms:

a. An accident involving the reactor on a submarine or nuclear weapons or both.

b. A terrorist attack on a submarine or on vehicles transporting nuclear weapons.

c. A nuclear attack on Faslane by another country.

a. Nuclear accident

Over the timescale considered in the White Paper it is likely that the risk of a nuclear accident at a civil facility will decline. Hunterston and Torness would reach the end of their planned life in 2011 and 2023 respectively. The decision to renew Trident means that the risk from defence nuclear facilities would remain a significant factor until at least 2055.

Nuclear warheads, containing a combination of nuclear material and high explosives, are transported on roads across Scotland several times each year. A major accident could lead to the dispersal of plutonium over a wide area. Plutonium emits alpha radiation. It is very dangerous but also difficult to detect. The Ministry of Defence recognise, in their safety case, that it is possible that an accident could result in a nuclear explosion. [3]

The operation of nuclear-powered ballistic-missile submarines from Faslane also poses a significant risk. An accident involving the reactor of a submarine could be on the same scale as Chernobyl. [4]

Defence nuclear facilities are not subject to the same regulation as civil sites. The Health and Safety Executive (HSE) are not given details of the design of submarine reactors or of nuclear weapons and they are not able to influence these designs.

Nuclear facilities at Devonport and Aldermaston in England are licensed by the HSE. However the sites in Scotland, at Faslane, Coulport and the naval test reactor in Dounreay, operate without a licence from the HSE. [5] Consequently the HSE are less able to reduce the risks or effects of a nuclear accident in Scotland.

The HSE requires that nuclear operators keep risks As Low As Reasonably Practicable (ALARP). However there are aspects of the operation of nuclear submarines and nuclear weapons that conflict with the ALARP principle. [6] For example there is not space in a submarine for the safety measures that would be required in a civil facility. Carrying torpedos and missiles significantly increases the risk of an explosion.

The MoD argue that they are a special case and have a “defence imperative”. However the view of the HSE is that this “defence imperative” is not in principle different from other imperatives, such as the Fire Service imperative (fire fighters may be exposed to greater risk carrying out their duties).

b. Terrorist attack

The consequences of a terrorist attack could be similar to an accident. However the likelihood of a terrorist attack is affected not just by technical considerations but also by an assessment of how many people are motivated to carry out such an attack. Existing MoD risk assessments may not accurately reflect this. These assessments lie at the heart of plans for responding to nuclear emergencies.

c. Nuclear attack on Faslane

The large arsenals of nuclear weapons held by Russia and the US are primarily maintained in order to attack one another. The British nuclear force at Faslane is integrated into the US nuclear system. Faslane is likely to remain a prime target for Russian nuclear planners so long as nuclear weapons are based on the Clyde.

A nuclear attack would probably involve several high yield nuclear weapons exploding over Faslane. Coulport would be a second target. If Russian intelligence assessed that a submarine was likely to be hidden in any other specific location, then it would be targeted. This would have a catastrophic impact on the West of Scotland.

Scottish Government responsibilities

The Scottish Government is responsible for civil defence and emergency planning. Scottish Ministers regulate and monitor the work of local authorities and emergency services. These local authorities and emergency services are required to assess risks and prepare adequate plans for a wide range of emergencies. [7]

There are some gaps in how these principles are applied to nuclear submarines and nuclear weapons. For example the Ministry of Defence argue that local authorities are only required to have plans for an emergency at designated berths. There are no equivalent civil plans for an accident on a submarine at sea.

Preparing for a nuclear emergency affects a wide range of devolved areas. In the event of a nuclear accident police could be required to implement measures to protect the public. Restrictions on agriculture and fishing could be imposed. Ambulances and hospitals would need to take special precautions to handle casualties who were contaminated with radiation. Health advice would be given to the public, including the provision of potassium iodate tablets. There would also be an impact on the economy and on tourism.

Environment

The Scottish Government has responsibility for the environment. It is also responsible for regulating the functions carried out by the Scottish Environmental Protection Agency (SEPA).

A serious accident, terrorist attack or nuclear attack would have a long term detrimental effect on the Scottish environment. In addition the renewal of Trident would have other implications for the environment.

Nuclear waste

Nuclear submarines at Faslane, nuclear warhead facilities at Coulport, and the naval test reactor at Dounreay all create nuclear waste. The continuation of these discharges over the next 50 years will have an impact on the environment.

Authorisations for nuclear discharges are issued under the Radioactive Substances Act 1993. However the Act does not apply to the MoD. Instead the MoD “issue analogous registrations and authorisations which are intended to have identical practical effect”. [8]

Discharges of liquid radioactive waste from Faslane into Gareloch and tritium into the atmosphere from Coulport are the subject of letters of agreement between the MoD and SEPA.

Impact on the local environment

The nuclear weapons’ store at Coulport currently occupies over 600 acres of land in one of the most scenic areas of Scotland. The area around Faslane and Coulport was specifically excluded from the Loch Lomond National Park. The construction of new facilities at Faslane and Coulport will have an impact on the environment. [9]

Policing, courts and prison service

In January 2007 an ICM opinion poll found that 73% of Scots were opposed to the Government’s plan to spend around £50 billion on new nuclear missiles. The Church of Scotland, Roman Catholic Church in Scotland and the Scottish Episcopal Church have all condemned the presence of nuclear weapons in Scotland. The Scottish Trade Union Congress has also spoken out against Trident.

This widespread opposition to Trident from the general public and from civic Scotland has been reflected in a series of demonstrations against nuclear weapons. Many of these have taken place at the Faslane nuclear base.

The decision to renew Trident is likely to result in continuing demonstrations in Scotland, including at Faslane and Coulport, for the next 50 years. These demonstrations will have an impact on policing. Officers will be diverted from other tasks in order to police these demonstrations.

Each time that nuclear weapons are transported by road across Scotland there is a substantial police operation to support the military convoy. This involves officers from several forces.

A significant number of people are willing to face arrest in order to try to prevent the operation of Weapons of Mass Destruction from Faslane. This has resulted in a significant number of court cases and some protesters spending time in prison. The renewal of Trident, in the face of substantial public opposition, is likely to have an impact on the judicial and prison systems.

Economic impact

In March 2007 Des Browne, the Defence Minister, said that there were 859 civilian jobs in Scotland which were directly dependent on Trident. The renewal of Trident will mean that a significant workforce continues to be employed sustaining nuclear-armed ballistic-missile submarines. These skills could be employed on project which produced greater long term value to Scotland. For example many of the workers could be employed in the construction of wave machines and other projects to tackle climate change. MoD police at Coulport could be retrained for civilian police work. The Coulport site which currently stores nuclear weapons and missiles, could be converted to an alternative industrial project.

Fishing

Submarines operating submerged around the coast of Scotland can present a hazard to fishing vessels. On 22 November 1990 the trawler Antares was sunk by the submarine HMS Trenchant. The Marine Accident Investigation board said that the accident was the result of “a partial breakdown in the watchkeeping structure and standards on board Trenchant”. [10]

Tourism

The deployment of new nuclear submarines and nuclear weapons to the Clyde is not consistent with presenting an image of Scotland as a place with a clean environment or as a place of peace. Renewing Trident will have a negative effect on the ability to attract visitors to Scotland. Ending their presence would be an opportunity to boost the image of the country.

Transport

Nuclear weapons are transported in large convoys including several 48 tonne lorries. These movements have an impact on the Scottish transport system.

The construction of new facilities at Faslane and Coulport will have an impact on the transport system in the surrounding area.

International legal obligations

While Foreign Affairs are reserved to Westminster, the Scotland Act 1998 says that “observing and implementing international obligations” are not reserved.

Article 6 of the nuclear Non Proliferation Treaty requires all nuclear weapons states to make progress towards disarmament. The renewal of Trident is not consistent with this undertaking and will encourage other states to ignore their obligations under the Treaty.

The NPT will be reviewed in 2010. A preparatory meeting was held in Vienna in May 2007. The Chair’s paper, summarising discussions at this meeting, said:

“Concern and disappointment were voiced about plans to replace or modernize nuclear weapons and their means of delivery or platform” [11]

The devolved functions outlined here are essential for the operation of nuclear submarines and weapons. Carrying out these functions for the next 50 years is not consistent with the obligations of the Non Proliferation Treaty.

The Scottish Government should be seen to comply with all its obligations under international law. The renewal of Trident presents a challenge to this compliance.

Financial impact

The White Paper indicates that the procurement costs of the new system will be between £15 and £20 billion. Annual running costs will be around £1.5 billion per year, or £45 billion over 30 years. The combined cost of building and running the new system will be at least £60. A further £24 billion will be spent on the current Trident system over the next 16 years.

Central government expenditure on this scale will have a significant impact on the budget of the Scottish Government and consequently on the ability of the Scottish Government to carry out its responsibilities.

John Ainslie, Coordinator, Scottish CND, 13 June 2007

1. Concordat between the Scottish Ministers and the Secretary of State for Defence; 17 April 2007; http://www.scotland.gov.uk/Resource/Doc/175752/0049502.pdf

2. The future of the United Kingdom Nuclear Deterrent, Cm 6994, December 2006; http://www.mod.uk/NR/rdonlyres/AC00DD79-76D6-4FE3-91A1-6A56B03C092F/0/DefenceWhitePaper2006_Cm6994.pdf.

3. Operational Safety Case for the Transport of Nuclear Weapons, Executive Summary, Issue 2, January 2005, Nuclear Movements and Nuclear Accident Response Group. Obtained under the FOIA by Rob Edwards, Sunday Herald. http://www.robedwards.com/2006/07/road_crash_coul.html

4. Hazards of a reactor accident, Department of nuclear science and technology, Royal Naval College Greenwich

5. NII Regulation of non-licenced naval nuclear sites, Issue 001, 19/03/07, Nuclear Safety Division – Business Management System, HSE; www.hse.gov.uk/foi/internalops/nsd/inspection/gins005issue1.pdf

6. Regulation of weapons and naval programme activity, Issue 001, 2/2/07, Nuclear Safety Division – Business Management System, HSE; www.hse.gov.uk/foi/internalops/nsd/inspection/gins004.pdf. The renewal of Trident could lead to extension of the life of the submarine reactor prototype at HMS Vulcan Dounreay, or to the construction of a new test facility at the site.

7. Specific responsibilities are outlined in the Civil Contingencies Act 2004, the Civil Contingencies Act 2004 (Contingency Planning) (Scotland) Regulations 2005 and the Radiation (Emergency Preparedness and Public Information) Regulations 2001 (REPPIR).

8. MoD Radioactive Waste Management, Chapter 6, RWMAC Annual Report 1999/2000, para 6.7; http://www.defra.gov.uk/rwmac/reports/annrpt9901/pdf/chap06.pdf

9. The White Paper says that £2 –3 billion will be spent on infrastructure over the life of the new submarine system. Parliamentary replies disclosed that this expenditure will be at Devonport and the Clyde Naval Base.

10. Report of the Chief Inspector of Marine Accidents into the collision between the Fishing Vessel Antares and HMS Trenchant with the loss of four lives on 22 November 1990, 15 April 1992. http://www.maib.gov.uk/cms_resources/antares_pub_1992.pdf

11. http://www.acronym.org.uk/npt/chair.pdf