Scottish CND Trident: Britain's Weapon of Mass Destruction
3.1 - Targeting a large number of cities
3.2 - Moscow Criterion
3.3 - Strategic Targeting of Trident today
3.4 - Alert status
3.1 Targeting a large number of cities
From 1956 to 1969 British strategic nuclear weapons were carried by V-bombers. Initially these carried atom bombs and later hydrogen bombs. There were two ways in which the bombers might have been given tasks. One was as part of a joint US and British nuclear force in a NATO attack. The second was as an independent British force, for which a British target plan was drawn up. According to a memorandum written by the Chief of Defence Staff, in 1959 a list was made of all Soviet cities with a population of over 100,000. From this list 98 cities were selected as targets on the basis of their administrative importance and population - the largest being chosen.
In 1968 the V-bombers were replaced by Polaris submarines. There were three armed submarines, with a fourth in refit. Each of the three armed submarines carried 16 missiles. Documents released in 1998 reveal that the initial British target plan for Polaris was aimed at 48 cities in the Soviet Union.
The former Permanent Secretary at the Ministry of Defence, Michael Quinlan, has indicated that British targeting has moved away from the plans described above. In discussing the ethics of nuclear weapons he talks about "final-sanction nuclear- strike" plans and says -
"The central idea in such plans would be to inflict disabling damage upon the aggressor state as a state, so as to remove or emasculate its ability and disposition to persist as an evil force against others, while keeping as low as possible (appallingly grave though that would probably still be) the harm done to innocent citizens. There is little doubt that in the earlier days of the nuclear age strategic targeting was not generally shaped in this way; but as time went on both US and UK planning options - French, Soviet, and now Russian ones may be a different matter - moved significantly in this direction " 19
What appears to have happened is that the focus of British targeting shifted from choosing a large number of cities on the basis of their population, to focusing on the Soviet and Russian command and control structure. 20 The centralisation of the old Soviet regime was such that this command and control system was and is heavily concentrated around Moscow. Field Marshall Nigel Bagnall, Chief of General Staff 1985-88, has said of the targeting of Trident "It is more than just the destruction of Moscow, it is the destruction of their command and control system". 21
If we look at past US nuclear planning, Soviet "leadership" targets were a special category. The ability to launch an attack on this command structure was regarded as crucial and as the last option in a nuclear exchange.22 In its independent plans Britain probably has this command structure as the main focus for its targeting. Quinlan would no doubt argue that launching a nuclear attack on this command structure is not the same as aiming to destroy Moscow, but it would, nonetheless, turn the city into a radioactive desert.
It is clear that the ability to launch an attack on the Moscow area has been the key factor determining the nature of British strategic nuclear forces since the mid 1970s. At this time the Anti- Ballistic Missile (ABM) system around the city was enhanced. Military planners in Britain calculated that this ABM system would prevent Britain from launching a nuclear attack. So a new British system, Chevaline, was designed specifically to overcome these ABMs. Chevaline was in service from 1982 to 1996 . The missiles were armed with decoys as well as warheads. The plan was to launched all 16 missiles from the submarine on patrol at Moscow as quickly as possible. The missile trajectories were adjusted so that all the warheads and decoys would land at around the same time and swamp the ABM defences.
Admiral Lord Lewin played a key role in the decision to build Trident. He has stressed the importance of the Moscow Criterion. He said: "Moscow was at the core of the Russian pysche, if you wiped out Moscow you destroyed the Soviet Unions will to succeed." 23
3.3 Strategic targeting of Trident today
While the Strategic Defence Review appears to suggest that there is no threat to British security and specifically no nuclear threat, the actual deployment of Trident described in the Review is not consistent with this.24 The Review indicates that it is the Governments intention to retain Trident on patrol for at least 20 years. With regard to responding to a strategic attack on NATO the Review says: "This Mission therefore provides for longer term insurance through a credible nuclear deterrent and the retention of essential military capabilities on which we could rebuild larger forces over a long period, if circumstances were radically to worsen." 25 The Review does not assign particular conventional forces to meeting a strategic attack on NATO as this is regarded as a remote possibility and only a potential threat in the long term. Yet this approach is not sustained in the nuclear area. The nuclear plans are not for a force which could be reconstituted with months or years of notice should the situation change, but to have one submarine at sea at all times.
In seeking to justify Trident, the Strategic Defence Review says that "very large numbers of strategic and shorter range nuclear weapons .. remain as a potent potential threat to the security of Britain and our Allies should current circumstances change for the worse." 26 This is alluding primarily to Russias nuclear arsenal.
Michael Clark, who has close contacts with the MoD, indicates that the Moscow criterion is still the key factor which determines how many Trident warheads are deployed. With regard to the Defence Review he said: "The ABM defences around Moscow remain the logical yardstick against which British strategic nuclear weapons are judged, since this represents the only defensive screen they might be required to penetrate in the foreseeable future."27
The idea of deploying nuclear missiles on submarines emerged during the Cold War as a way of concealing the location of the missiles from the Soviet Union. Keeping one submarine on patrol was designed to ensure that the submarine could not be destroyed either by Soviet missiles, or by Soviet submarines. The government has decided to continue having one submarine on patrol at all times. This is a clear indication that Trident is still regarded as primarily for use against Russia.
The Government have said that normally three Trident submarines will be fully armed at all times.28 The day to day operations of the nuclear fleet confirm that this is the case. This constant armed status is a further indication that the Trident force is still geared up to a strategic nuclear exchange with Russia. In the Cold War stand-off no time was allowed for loading missiles or warheads onto the submarines, they were kept armed at all times. Several submissions were made to the Strategic Defence Review advocating that warheads and missiles should be removed from the submarines and stored on land. However the Ministry of Defence has rejected these proposals. Their policy is still to have nuclear weapons ready for use at short notice.
Further indication of the ongoing tension is the deployment of submarines to intercept missile submarines. It was reported that Russian submarines were sent to try to detect HMS Vanguard while it was carrying out trials. On the other hand it would appear that US hunter-killer submarines are still routinely stationed close to the Russian submarine bases. The Commander of the Russian Northern Fleet has objected to their presence. British hunter-killer submarines may also take part in these missions.
In the case of US nuclear forces, while the planning process now incorporates potential threats from anywhere, concern about Russia remains central - "Russia remains the focus of the Posture review not because its intentions are hostile, but because it currently controls the only nuclear arsenal that can physically threaten the survivability of US nuclear forces."29
In the days of the V-bombers there were always several aircraft on Quick Reaction Alert, armed and ready for take off. Air Vice Marshall Bobby Robson said of the V- bombers "no-one could deny you were on a war footing".30 With Polaris, the submarine on patrol was at 15 minutes notice to fire its missiles. Commander Jeffrey Tall, Captain of HMS Repulse from 1989 to 1991, said "There was no doubt that when we went to sea we went to war".31
The Strategic Defence Review says that the Trident submarines "are routinely at a notice to fire measured in days".32 The submarine on patrol can be involved in hydrographic surveys, equipment trials and exercises with other vessels, so long as these tasks do not compromise its security. But the hair-trigger posture could be reintroduced at short notice - "Its readiness state could, however, be quickly increased if required".33
The Review failed to take the submarines off continuous patrol which would be the clearest indication of a lower state of readiness. With regard to the recent measures which have been taken, the Defence Secretary has said that "No physical changes to the missiles or guidance systems are involved" and that the submarine will remain "invisible and undetectable".34 Michael Clark says that it is "a procedural, rather than technical, change and is not capable of international verification".35 He also argues that de-alerting measures may be applied to parts of the large US and Russian arsenals, but not to the British nuclear force which he and the MoD regard as a minimum force. He says "the UK is not particularly sympathetic to the concept of de-alerting".36
In 1994 an agreement was reached that the UK and Russia would no longer target each other. Under this agreement the computer inside the missile will be set at co- ordinates in the South Atlantic. But, the co-ordinates of real targets are still held elsewhere on the submarine, in a disk drive in a computer connected to the missiles.37
Military planners will assume that, in a time of crisis, radio communications with submarines could be disrupted.38 So, although a Trident submarine is capable of receiving targeting information by radio, lists of target data will be stored on board, in the Fire Control computers.39 According to a former US Trident missile technician, it takes only 3 minutes to transfer the data from these computers into the missiles. Bruce Blair says that it takes 10 minutes to insert the target data and to accelerate the gyroscopes in the guidance system on the missile.40
Notes
19. He also said that he would consider planning for "city bashing" to be immoral, Thinking about Nuclear Weapons, Michael Quinlan, RUSI Journal, Dec 1997
20. British Nuclear Targeting, Lawrence Freedman, in D Ball and J Richardson eds, Strategic Nuclear Targeting, 1986.
21. Moscow Criterion, BBC, Broadcast Jul 1995.
22. The Logic of Accidental Nuclear War, Bruce Blair, 1993, p122f
23. Moscow Criterion, BBC
24. The SDR said that ".. there is today no direct military threat to the United Kingdom or Western Europe. Nor do we foresee the re-emergence of such a threat". SDR Jul 1998, p5. With specific regard to the threat from a nuclear armed enemy the Defence Secretary has also said that "We do not see any immediate nuclear threats to the United Kingdom". Hansard 10 Jun 1998. With no enemies in sight George Robertson has identified a more abstract opposition: "The world is now a much more complex and confusing place. However, some people continue to say, who is the enemy now that the Warsaw pact has gone ? I have a clear answer for them - the enemy is the instability that can threaten the peace and prosperity that we now enjoy." Hansard 27 Oct 1997. The Defence Review identifies new risks - "drugs and organised crime", "new and horrifying forms of terrorism", "serious environmental degredation" and the vulnerabilities of information technology. It says "we must make sure that the Armed Forces can play as full and effective a part in dealing with these new risks as the old". The idea that we need Trident to respond to these new dangers in absurd - bu that does not mean that it is beyond the reasoning of the nuclear lobby. The Commander of the US Atlantic submarine fleet, Rear Admiral Roger Bacon, is on record as saying that Trident submarines and missiles were needed to act "as a defence against terrorism, drug trading and other global conflicts."
25. SDR p 16
26. SDR Essay 5, para 4
27. De-alerting and the UK Nuclear Deterrent, Michael Clarke, Centre for Defence Studies Bulletin, Oct 1998, p8. The former Defence Minister said "decisions about our force structures and postures should take into account what has proved hitherto to be successful in maintaining stability in the presence of Russia's military strength." UK Defence Strategy, A Continuing Role for Nuclear Weapons, Malcolm Rifkind, speech at Centre for Defence Studies, 16 Nov 1993, para 13
28. Hansard 28 Jul 1998
29. Nuclear Policy Review, 1995 Annual Defence Report, US DoD. This review also said that the US would have adequate weapons to "deter a hostile Russian government by holding at risk a range of assets valued by its political and military leaders."
30. Moscow Criterion, BBC
31. ibid
32. SDR Essay 5, para 12
33. Hansard Lords, 28 Jul 1998
34. Hansard 2 Nov 1998; Nuclear Disarmament in the Modern World, George Roberston, speech at Aberdeen University, 1 Mar 1999
35. Michael Clarke, op cit, p 8
36. ibid
37. Zero Alert for Global Nuclear Forces, Bruce Blair, Brookings, 1995, p87. This refers to the Fire Control system on US Trident submarines (MK98 Mod 4). The one on British submarines (Mk98 Mod 5) is almost identical
38. The film Crimson Tide gave a dramatic illustration of the implications of a failure in submarine communications.
39. In June 1997 the US Navy tendered for contracts for Power PCs and software for "evolving mission critical functions in support of Strategic Targeting System" for both US and UK Trident fire control systems. This provides a facility for rapid retargeting in addition to the main target sets. US Naval Surface Warfare Centre solicitation N00178-97-Q-0013
40. Zero Alert for Global Nuclear Forces, Bruce Blair, p87