Potential nuclear capability of Iran? - Consequences and Reasons?
(A summary of recent developments - by James Neely)

The problem surrounding Iran's quest to build nuclear facilities stems from one simple question. Why would a country rich in both oil and gas reserves require or desire to develop these facilities? Furthermore, a potential backlash from the Bush government, whom previously labelled Iran as part of the "Axis of Evil", may occur as a preventative measure against the development of nuclear capabilities or is this another excuse for regime change.

In an interview with the Guardian's Mathew Tempest in February 2003, Chomsky discussed the notion of Iran as the US' next potential target after Iraq. Chomsky explains that with the Iraqi Shiite majority, any potentially successful democratic rule in Iraq could develop an alliance between these nations whom previously had anything but the best relationship. This cannot be beneficial as "Iran is its [The US'] next target".

With the surrounding US military presence throughout the Gulf and parts of Central Asia, Iran appears a prime target to attack. However, according to Patrick J Buchanan, a former Republican presidential candidate, support may not be as forthcoming for such an attack with Blair's weakened political position within the UK. From a British perspective, Jack Straw's comment that Britain would not support action within Iran supports Buchanan's point, although Blair has expressed concerns over Iran's nuclear program.

Bush warned Iran not to develop nuclear weapons and the latter has been accused of accommodating Al-Qaeda terrorists following the Riyadh suicide bombers. However, is the US desire for regime change clouding judgement and taking foremost position regarding policy? Whether this is the case, a Washington Post/ABC poll estimate 56% of Americans would support military conflict in Iran as a pre-emptive strike against the construction of nuclear weapon facilities.

In addition, the Toronto Star discusses the influence of the Israeli-US friendship to policy orientation. Is Iran a US target becuase of its potential threat to Israel, therefore overlooking greater future threats to world stability.

The Office of the Spokesman in Washington DC explained that they believed Iran was using Bushehr as a "cover and a pretext for obtaining sensitive technologies to advance its nuclear weapons program".

The Iranian nuclear development program began in 1974, but was deferred during the revolution of 1978-79. Although there are conflicting opinions as to Ayatollah Khomeini opinion of nuclear weapons, he resumed the program in 1984. With damage to a reactor following Iraqi strikes in 1987-88, the program was again delayed. Although Iran certainly appears to desire nuclear capabilities, it has joined the Non-proliferation Treaty (NPT) (1970) and allowed the IAEA to inspect its programs. On the 8th January 1994, an agreement between Iran and Russia to build two $1 billion reactors capable of producing 1,300 megawatts was signed.

Obviously a reason for any potential action is required. Could this derive from Iran's stance on producing nuclear capabilities, whether for weapons or as an alternative energy source? This is beginning to sound like a similar argument to the last war embarked upon. However, the US have accepted Russia's efforts to assist Iran's goal to build a nuclear reactor for civil purposes is legal. Therefore, this contradicts any future US position to wage war on Iran as a move against their nuclear program and potential build up of WMDs.

Contradictory arguments exist as to whether possessing nuclear weapons could prevent US imperialist strategy, or whether nuclear weapons could "turn us [Iran] into a threat to others that could be exploited in a dangerous way". Either of these scenarios instigates fear in an already apprehensive US.

The Guardian explains Iran has been constructing a centrifuge development plant south of Tehran which could be used to create uranium to develop several nuclear missiles. However, Iran's dependency on Russia has led to intense US pressure to end compliance on the issue.

The BBC follows Russia's assistance to Iran in the construction of an $800 billion nuclear reactor in Bushehr. Putin argued which many Western companies are assisting Iran in the development of nuclear capabilities, provided this is primarily for "dual use". By this it means they could be employed for either civil or military purposes. Conditions applied by Russia include Iran's signing additional International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) protocols. The IAEA is an organisation which oversees the application of nuclear facilities.

It is difficult to understand the reasoning behind Russian assistance of Iran's nuclear program. It certainly cannot be for economic benefits as the US has offered monetary incentives via economic opportunities to withdraw Russia's cooperation.

However, a CNN article suggests Russia is attempting to promote regional stability by assisting Iran, rather than creating potential conflict against third party nations. Russia and Iran have mutual political and military interests throughout the vast, resource-dominated Caspian Sea area.

Iran claims it is developing a nuclear program as a future source of power to supersede its natural resources in the future. This is paradoxical when compared to the fact that "it currently throws away more energy annually by flaring off natural gas than Bushehr could produce", explained Boucher, the State Department Spokesman.

Although debatably all countries morally should provide a positive example regarding non-proliferation of nuclear weapons, Russia certainly should not be assisting any countries in their development. Even if on the pretext of providing civil nuclear facilities for the production of energy alone, it is not a safe source of power. Historical disasters regarding nuclear production demonstrate these problems. The infamous 1986 Chernobyl disaster released radioactivity throughout the Northern Hemisphere, from Europe to North America. The resulting health problems in Belarus, Ukraine and Russia still remain today.

This idea of a dual use of nuclear facilities is explained partially for production of energy, although the military reasons are not emphasised. However, by implication the alternative source for their imposition may be their warlike values and therefore nuclear weaponry for militaristic purposes. Reports compare India's development of its civil nuclear program with this same possibility in Iran. Although the former used plutonium whereas the latter opted for uranium. However, the similiraity ended as India was not a signatory of the NPT, although there are suggestions the treaty itself may become obsolete?

All the states involved in the development of nuclear weapons mentioned above have signed the NPT. This was designed to promote the safe use of nuclear power and disarmament of atomic weapons. Both Iran and Russia are members, although the latter stated that it would oblige ex-Soviet Union agreements in place. However, the promotion of nuclear capabilities for military purposes contradicts the very nature of this treaty. Furthermore, if British companies are involved then the government are in breach of the treaty.

This contrasts a previous Guardian report, which suggests Russia's atomic energy minister, Alexander Rumyantsev, felt a British based company, Urenco, had been supplying uranium enrichment apparatus to Iran. The designs found in Iran were similar to those of Urenco. US reports claim the Natanz centrifuge can be traced to a former Urenco-employed Pakistani nuclear engineer.

However, according to MSNBC News, Iran argues their nuclear program is an alternative source of energy supply, as a consequence of depleting oil supplies. However, although Gholamreza Aghazadeh, the head of the Iranian nuclear program, agreed to cooperate with the IAEA, he only commented that the IAEA had not requested for an end of its aims to enrich uranium, to the disappointment of other nations. Furthermore, Aghazadeh describes the potential difference between US and European policy regarding objective analysis of Iranian program, with the former requesting declaration of Iran's violation of the nuclear NPT, which could thus be applied as justification for future military action.

A map and guide of the location of Iran's plutonium and enriched uranium facility.

Concern exists over Iran's previous failure regarding the reporting of "material, facilities and activities", the chairwomen's summary of an IAEA report explains. In contrast, support for Iran's "commitment to full transparency" and consequently allowing the IAEA to objectively assess the intentions behind the Iranian nuclear program. The report explains discussions held in February 2003 which examined the potential for Iran to develop enrichment capabilities at the Kalaye Electric Company, Tehran. The government was forthcoming that there had been development of "centrifuge components", although denying this had been involved as an application with its nuclear development. It was simply a series of "simulation studies". The request to visit these sites was originally rejected, although limited access was permitted in March, with full access occurring in May.

The report examines issues developed as a consequence of when the IAEA must be informed of Iran's importation of material. All materials acquired which were covered under Iran's Safeguard Agreement must be reported. However, discrepencies were uncovered after discovering Iran incorrectly believed only uranium weighing more than one kilogram were required to be shown to the IAEA.

Falsely interpreted ideas and secrecy over the program understandably create scepticism as to the intentions of Iran's nuclear program. Although potentially these documents could be misunderstood, importation allowances are factors of such importance they should have been read carefully and fully understood. Furthermore any confusion could easily have been clarified with the IAEA.

Further inconsistencies highlighted in the report are the size and weight of cylinders, and a missing 1.9 kilograms of UF6 as a result of "leaking valves", which had gone unnoticed.

This does not install confidence as to safety measures to prevent potential nuclear catastrophes.

The IAEA expressed concern over Iran's "research and development on centrifuges" and claim testing had not used UF6, UO2 and UF6 - all uranium compounds. Further concern over its application with lasers exists, although Iran is adamant that no enrichment laser testing has occurred.

The report emphasises its concern over a variety of failings by Iran to report on these issues. Although these are being rectified this is still an ongoing process. Moreover, certain areas where indescrepancies exist will be examined in detail in the future. The Director General feels Iran should agree to Additional Protocols, as it has comprehensive nuclear programs.

According to an article in the Washington Post, the US is reverting to a multilateral approach through the use of the UN and IAEA to gather support and apply political pressure on Iran.

An article in the Guardian advocates the prevention of amassing nuclear weapons by applying tactics to "woo rather than isolate". The removal of sanctions and inviting Iran to join international organisations, such as the WTO, security could be assured without the need for WMDs.

Conservative US estimates as to the time-scale that Iran may be able to produce a nuclear bomb indicate toward the end of the decade. This is contrasted by a statement from the Israeli foreign minister, Silvan Shalom, that this could occur around the turn of 2006. Whether this is propaganda from either side to achieve support for their perspectives, or neither are accurate are irrelevant, as nuclear facilities are an undesirable aspect of the modern world.

(This report was written by James Neely who is helping Scottish CND with research work, it does not necessarily reflect the policy of Scottish CND)

Additional links, resources and recommended reading:

Scottish Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament:
http://www.banthebomb.org

Greenpeace:
http://www.greenpeace.org/international_en/campaigns/intro?campaign_id=3940

Federation of American Scientists:
http://www.fas.org
http://www.fas.org/nuke/guide/iran/nuke/index.html
http://www.fas.org/news/iran/1995/mes95064.htm

Centre for Defence Information:
http://www.cdi.org/nuclear/
http://www.nci.org/conf/davis/davis.htm