Hutton Enquiry - "...urgently to conduct an investigation into the circumstances surrounding the death of Dr Kelly."

Update: 12-Aug-2003 - this is an update of the progress of the Hutton Inquiry and relevant news

Background

The inquiry, to be led by a senior judge, began on Monday 11 August 2003.

A statement by Lord Hutton.

Dr Kelly's original testamony before the Foreign Affairs Committee can be seen here.

A profile of Dr Kelly.

A timeline of events can be seen here.

The September Dossier, containing the 45 minute claim.

A Forethought:

Another prespective to examine this situation on regards the meaning and interpreatation of the 45 minute claim. Does the claim itself refer to the time required for the launching of weapons or for the length of time to impact of enemy targets? The dossier itself suggests Iraq has "military plans for the use of chemical and biological weapons, including against its own Shia population. Some of these weapons are deployable within 45 minutes of an order to use them". However, the word "deploy" has two, although similar to an extent, in this context, slightly ambiguous meanings. Adapted from the Merriam-Webster online:

"1 a : to extend (a military unit) especially in width b : to place in battle formation or appropriate positions
2 : to spread out, utilize, or arrange especially strategically
intransitive senses : to move in being deployed"

This causes confusion as to the supposed interpretation of the claim and adds further difficulty regarding whether the wording was spun, or is this ambiguity a simple miscalculatin of the contexts this could be taken in.

Week 1:

Witnesses to be called during week one::

Monday, 11 August

Terence Taylor (International Institute of Strategic Studies)
Richard Hatfield (Ministry of Defence)
Martin Howard (Ministry of Defence)
Patrick Lamb (Foreign and Commonwealth Office)
Julian Miller (Cabinet Office)

Tuesday, 12 August

Andrew Gilligan (BBC reporter)
Susan Watts (BBC reporter)

Wednesday, 13 August

Susan Watts (BBC reporter)
Gavin Hewitt (BBC reporter)
Richard Sambrook (BBC, Head of News)
Brian Wells (Ministry of Defence0

Thursday, 14 August

Brian Wells (Ministry of Defence)
Martin Howard (Ministry of Defence)
John Williams (Foreign and Commonwealth Office)

Day 1: Monday 11th August

Comments that other senior intelligence officals shared Dr David Kelly's concerns about the wording of the Iraqi dossier. Certain officials passed on their concerns to their more senior officials, reports the Guardian. Specific problems existed with the 45 minute claim, coincidentally the central point in the argument between the BBC and No 10. One official emailed, following a conversation with Dr Kelly explained, "The existing wording is not wrong - but it has a lost (sic) of spin." Further complaints existed on the application of language, such as "intelligence suggests", "intelligence indicates" or "intelligence shows".

It could be further argued warning was provided by the CIA that the 45 minute claim were misleading and unreliable.

According to friend and professor at Leeds University, Alastair Hay said on Newsnight that Dr Kelly was unique in his expertise and knowledge on the situation in Iraq. Patrick Lamb, the deputy head of Foreign and Commonwealth counter-proliferation department described the confidence people had in Dr Kelly's expertise.

Lamb said, "If I had to make a choice between a textual source and Dr Kelly, I would often back Dr Kelly ahead of the textual source ... such was his expertise and such was our confidence in him." With such expertise, it would appear appropriate to have paid more heed to Dr Kelly's opinion.

Julian Miller, the chief of the assessment staff, defends No 10 with his comment, "I don't think there was a transformation a week before publication, and certainly changes such as the inclusion of the reference to 45 minutes were nothing to do with Number 10."

Day 2: Tuesday 12th August

Andrew Gilligan's evidence:

Andrew Gilligan explained prior to meeting Dr Kelly he researched his career and standing on the internet and in various books. Dr Kelly was described as "the senior adviser to the MoD on biological defence and one of the world's leading experts in biological weapons". Furthermore, Tom Mangold's Plague Wars explained that "If David Kelly were a tax inspector he would recoup Britain's entire national debt."

Andrew Gilligan read his notes from meetings with Dr Kelly. These described Alastair Campbell as having "real information but unreliable included against our wishes ... he asked if anything else could go in."

Lord Hutton questioned Mr Gilligan: "You put the question 'Was it to make it sexier?' and Dr Kelly replied 'Yes, to make it sexier'."

Mr Gilligan replied: "Yes."

Lord Hutton asked: "Are you clear in your recollection that you asked how was it transformed and that the name Campbell was first spoken by Dr Kelly."

Mr Gilligan answered: "Yes, absolutely."

Lord Hutton: "It wasn't a question by you saying `Is Campbell involved in this?'."

Mr Gilligan answered: "No, it was him. He raised the subject of 45 minutes and he raised the subject of Campbell."

On the 45 minutes specifically, I also saw that the 18 language changed a bit. In the body of the dossier it 19 says that weapons of mass destruction could be "deployed 20 or deployable within 45 minutes". In the foreword it 21 says they could be "ready within 45 minutes". It may be 22 a semantic distinction but "ready" is a stronger word 23 I think than "deployable". That is a slightly more 24 debatable point, it is a semantic debate, but I think 25 "ready" is a stronger word. "Deployable" just means 36 1 moveable.

Mr Gilligan mentions the difference in the language in the main body of the text from the introduction. In these parts respectively, the words "deployable within 45 minutes" was substituted with "ready within 45 minutes". Mr Gilligan believes the latter is a stronger form of wording, which although a subjective comment could be argued effectively.

Dr Kelly was quoted to have said, "Most people in intelligence weren't happy with the dossier, because it didn't reflect the considered view they were putting forward."

Susan Watts' evidence:

Susan Watts rejected suggestions Dr Kelly told her Alastair Cambell himself included the infamous 45 minute claim. Susan Watts and Dr Kelly speculated regarding the origins of the 45 minute claim, and which weapons it may be refering to. According to Susan Watts, Dr Kelly "said that he was...guessing; but he said that in 1991 the Iraqis were, and I quote, "playing around with multibarrel launches and that these take 45 minutes to fill". So that was his best guess...as to where that figure had come from". Susan Watts expanded on her own ideas as to the meaning of this, for example he "was not suggesting it was necessarily false. But I think he was suggesting to me it might not necessarily only have one interpretation."

Day 3: Wednesday 13th August:

Susan Watts began wanting to review the evidence given yesterday. She felt the the final 30 minutes of the hearing proceeded too quickly.

When asked if she had anything further to add, Susan Watts explained she felt under "considerable pressure" from the BBC. Moreover, she felt her story was to "corroborate the Andrew Gilligan allegations". Susan Watts said her own reports on Newsnight corroborated one another and did nothing for Gilligan's broadcast. Watts went for independent legal advice regarding the pressure to give up her source and "the misguided strategy in the use of those Newsnight reports"

Gavin Hewitt's evidence:

Gavin Hewitt, a BBC reporter, explains through his conversations with Dr Kelly, his informed opinion was that although the dossier was changed, it was a "two-way process" with information being added or removed, but not from only one perspective. More specifically, Dr Kelly did not categorically say that Number 10 was involved, although this conversation only arose following Dr Kelly's comment that, "No. 10 spin 5 came into play".

Richard Sambrook's evidence:

The Director of News for the BBC was called. The majority of his evidence relates to the exchange of letters between Mr Sambrook and Mr Campbell. However, his attention turns to the similarities to Mr Gilligan and Ms Watts reports. He comments on Ms Watts' opinion that the BBC were trying to "mould" the stories so as to corroborate one another. However, for Mr Sambrook the two stories were so similar, and therefore probably derived from the same source, which, justifies his reasoning to investigate the matter. In an attempt to uncover the source, Mr Sambrook approached the editor of Newsnight, George Entwhistle. However, Mr Entwhistle's loyalty was compromised between his employer and employee, consequently putting him in an awkward position. As a result, Mr Sambrook withdrew his request for the intentity of the source.

In contrast to Ms Watts' opinion of the removal of her obligation to Dr Kelly following his evidence to the Foreign Affairs Committee (FAC), Mr Sambrook felt Dr Kelly was evasive and should still receive the confidentiality as a source from the BBC.

Day 4: Thursday 14th August

According to an article in the Guardian, various drafts of the dossier existed. One draft did not contain the 45 minute claim, whereas a subsequent one did. This claim was watered down and strengthened during the editing of the following drafts.

The Guardian explains that Geoff Hoon, the defence secretary, overruled Sir Kevin Tebbit, a top MoD official, and insisted Dr Kelly must testify to the FAC for "presentational" purposes. Tony Blair was resolute and "ordered" Dr Kelly to undertake the questioning. Furthermore, Dr Kelly required " a proper security-style interview in which all the inconsistencies are thrashed out", an ominous sounding toil.

During Mr Wells evidence, he was asked how Dr Kelly appeared during the presentation of his evidence. Mr Wells responded that although he appeared composed during questioning, he looked destressed from time to time. An MoD note taken by Mr Howard explained "Kelly is apparently feeling the pressure and is not handling it well". Dr Kelly was found dead less then five days later.

Week 2:

Witnesses to be called during week two:

Monday, 18 August

Pam Teare (Ministry of Defence Press Office)
Jonathan Powell (Prime Minister's Office)
Sir David Manning (Prime Minister's Office)

Tuesday, 19 August

Sir David Manning (Prime Minister's Office)
Alastair Campbell (Prime Minister's Office)

Wednesday, 20 August

Sir Kevin Tebbit (Ministry of Defence)
Godric Smith (Prime Minister's Press Office) - a profile
Tom Kelly (Prime Minister's Press Office) - a profile

Thursday, 21 August

Donald Anderson MP (Foreign Affairs Select Committee)
Nick Rufford (Sunday Times, journalist)
James Blitz (Financial Times, journalist)
Richard Norton-Taylor (Guardian, journalist)
Tom Baldwin (The Times, journalist)
Lee Hughes (Hutton Inquiry Secretariat)

Source: adapted from http://www.the-hutton-inquiry.org.uk

Day 5: Monday 18th August

Miss Teare's primary responsibility is to deal with the press office and media. According to Mis Teare's evidence, the first journalist to name Dr Kelly was Chris Adams of the Financial Times. When asked if Dr Kelly was the name proposed by the MoD to the BBC for validation, Miss Teare confirmed his belief. Shortly afterwards, the Guardian put forward Dr Kelly's name to the Press Office. Miss Teare also explained the wrong names were mentioned by certain journalists prior to Dr Kelly's name being released in the media. Dr Kelly's name was further mentioned by Richard Taylor, the special advisor to Geoff Hoon.

Mr Jonathan Powell's evidence:

An email from Jonathan Powell to John Scarlett demonstrates problems with the Iraqi dossier, although none of which are related to the presentation. The first point that the dossier "does nothing to demonstrate a threat, let alone an imminent threat from Saddam". The email continues to explain, "we will need to make it clear in launching the document that we do not claim to have evidence that he is an imminent threat". This contradicts the stance by Number 10 as Mr Blair addressed the nation that the Iraqi "threat is real".

Further evidence from Mr Powell demonstrated Mr Blair's concern regarding Dr Kelly's opinion and its effect on the government.

A preview of the insiders of the No 10 team.

Day 6: Tuesday 19th August

The key points:

Campbell - "I had no input, output, influence upon it whatever at any stage of the process", the inquiry heard.

An extract from Campbell's diary - "Why Iraq, why now?" This can only add further sceptisim if the spin meister of Downing Street is looking beneath the lines of the attack on Iraq.

Alastair Campbell gave evidence for the full day, explaining the John Scarlett had the primary influence over the presentation and content of theIraqi dossier. Mr Campbell said "the drier [the dossier] the better. Cut the rhetoric. I thought there were areas where the language was too colourful. I also said the more intelligence-based it was, the better".

Mr Campbell said he had no part in the naming of Dr Kelly and further distanced himself from under fire Geoff Hoon, the Defence Secretary. Mr Hoon is said to be unhappy at Downing Street blaming him of naming Dr Kelly. However, when quesitoned on the 45 minute claim, Mr Campbell said "I had no input, output, or influence on them whatsoever at any stage in the process".

Day 7: Wednesday 20th August

Summaries of the main points can be seen here and here.

Sir Kevin Tebbit said Dr Kelly admitted to talking to Andrew Gilligan. Following this, Sir Kevin asked the MoD Personnel Director, Richard Hatfield, to interview Dr Kelly.

On 3 July, Sir Kevin briefed Geoff Hoon on events without naming Dr Kelly. More so, he felt it was "inevitable" the media would uncover the identity of the source of the Gilligan report. However, even if this was so, the question of who actually released the identity of Dr Kelly still exists.

Day 8: Thusrday 21th August

The inquiry heard Dr Kelly told David Broucher, a UN representative, that if Iraq were to be invaded he would "probably be found dead in the woods". Mr Broucher thought this comment was related to Iraqis desiring revenge if war broke out. For more detail on this see here.

Further problems arose for spin doctor Alastair Campbell today following Tory MP and committee member, John Maples said Campbell had "seriously misled" the Hutton Inquiry over the number of alterations he made to the dossier. Mr Campbell claimed he made only eleven changes, although a letter addressed to John Scarlett showed he had actually advocated fifteen changes. More importantly, one of these changes related to the 45 minute depoloyment of WMD claim, which set this chain of events in motion. Originally, the word "may" appeared in the dossier, however Mr Campbell felt this did not provide enough emphasis and when the dossier was published, it was replaced with the word "are". This claim alone would justify Andrew Gilligan's broadcast that the dossier was "sexed up".

Witnesses to be called during week three:

Monday, 26 August

Geoff Hoon

Day 9: Monday 25 August

A poll conducted on the 7th September 2003 showed 43% of voters believed Tony Blair should resign after the Dr Kelly fiasco.

John Scarlett emailed Alastair Campbell of a number of suggested changes to the forward of the dossier. The main issues were the "references to the JIC and the use of intelligence". Consequently, the wording was altered from "The document published today is the work of the Joint Intelligence Committee" to included "The document published today is based, in large part, on the work of the Joint Intelligence Committee". Another suggested change was the PM's claim that "what I believe the JIC reports have established beyond any doubt" to "what I believe assessed intelligence has established beyond doubt". However, neither of these changes were made in a copy sent to Mr Scarlett, although Alastair Campbell explained he sent the wrong copy by mistake. check if these changes were made.

Day 10: Tuesday 26th August

Witnesses to be called during week four:

Monday, 1 September

Mrs Kelly (Family)
Sarah Pape (Family)
Rachel Kelly (Family)
Professor Roger Avery (Friend)
David Wilkins (Family)


Tuesday, 2 September

Ruth Absalom (Neighbour)
Dr Malcolm Warner (GP)
Louise Holmes (Search team)
Paul Chapman (Search team)
PC Martyn Sawyer
PC Andrew Franklin
PC Jonathan Martyn
Sergeant Geoffrey Webb
David Bartlett (Ambulance)
Vanessa Hunt (Ambulance)
Barney Leith (Baha'i faith)
Professor Hawton (Psychiatrist)

Wednesday, 3 September

Richard Allan (Toxicologist)
Assistant Chief Constable Page
Steven Macdonald (MOD)
Personnel (Defence Intelligence Staff)
Mr Green (Forensic Biologist )
Patrick Lamb (FCO)

Thursday, 4 September

Olivia Bosch (Colleague)
Leigh Potter (Neighbour)
Richard Taylor (Special Adviser to Secretary of State for Defence)

Tom Mangold (Journalist)

Witnesses to be called during week 5:

Re-call of witnesses.

Day 17: Tuesday 16th September

Cross-examination of witnesses began today. Barristers from the government, the Kelly family and the BBC were allowed to question the witnesses.

Martin Howard, the deputy chief of defence intelligence, was asked by the Kelly family lawyer, Jeremy Gompertz QC, if he believed through the information he provided meant that "any able journalist, with a little research, would be able to identify Dr Kelly". Mr Howard further explained he did not think Dr Kelly was treated "shabbily".

Dr Kelly was not told by the MoD his name was to be published.

Day 18: Wednesday 17th September

Mr Gilligan today acknowledged that he had made fundamental errors in his handling and reporting of Dr Kelly. Arguments exist as to whether Mr Gilligan was pressured from above to report dramatically more significant bulletins at the expense of factual content. Furthermore, he admitted to a "slip of the tongue"

Day 19: Thursday 18th September

Richard Hatfield, one of the bosses of the former weapons expert Dr Kelly, told the inquiry of the latter's "fundamental failing" in not informing anyone of his contact with journalists. He said that if he had known then what he now knew he would have suspended Dr Kelly.

Following two meetings between the pair, the MoD desired Dr Kelly inform the media of his discussions with Mr Gilligan, although the actual reporting of these meetings was embellished by the journalist. Mr Hatfield further stated his belief Dr Kelly was treated in an "outstanding" manner by the MoD.

A computer analyst reviewing the notes in Andrew Gilligan's personal organiser explained that his notes of conversations with Dr Kelly differed. Mr Wilding said: "This has worried me quite a lot. The version of Kelly.text dated May 21 2003 is different from the version produced by Mr Gilligan to the inquiry. There's no mention of Campbell in this memorandum". Mr Gilligan's organiser had two versions of his meeting with the weapons expert, although only the second contained the name "Campbell". However, Mr Gilligan denied he had doctored his notes, explaining the only reason the name was nt included was to save time as he typed while Dr Kelly talked, prior to reviewing them with Dr Kelly to see what he could actually quote.

Day 20: Monday 23rd September

Geoff Hoon admitted although knowing newspaper stories regarding the 45 minute claim were wrong, he did not correct them. The claim regarded "battlefield munitions" rather than longe range targeting of WMD. Mr Hoon did not participate in the construction of the dossier, however he did agree that should it arise, Dr Kelly's name would be confirmed.

Mr Campbell explained his task was to tighten the dossier up, making a strong argument for the case to go to war. When asked by Andrew Caldecott, the BBC's lawyer, to explain the difference between "sexing up" and developing a strong argument, Mr Campbell responded, "if you are syaing strong equals sexed up, I do not accept that at all. If you are saying strong equals a good solid piece of work, that does the job the prime minister wants it to do, I would agree with that".

Extracts from Alastair Campbell's diary were released today. These demonstrated Mr Hoon pushing for Dr Kelly's name to be released to the public. A conversation between Mr Campbell and Mr Hoon was written about in the former's diary, stating both believed "it would fuck Gilligan if that was his source". Both felt Dr Kelly would explain he had been mis-represented by Mr Gilligan.

Day 21: Tuesday 24th September

John Scarlett today confirmed he had approved all changes designed to tighten the dossier. Mr Scarlett explained he advocated many changes to the dossier, such as altering the name from "Iraq's Programme for Weapons of Mass Destruction" to "Iraq's Weapons of Mass Destruction". However, he did receive help and advice from the committee chaired by Alastair Campbell regarding the "structure, format and presentation" of the document.

When quizzed on the 45 minute claim, now understood to be related to battlefield munitions rather than long range deployment, Mr Scarlett responded that this "certainly" was possible. Questions arose regarding headlines about the 45 minute claim possible dangers to Britain, Mr Scarlett explained it was not his duty to correct the press.

Problems arose when an email sent from Jonathon Powell to Mr Scarlett. Mr Powell argued Saddam would only use WMD if attacked first. Therefore, the entire justification and basis for going to war was compromised as there was no direct threat to Britain. Concern had previously existed to the "sexing up" the dossier by including more information, the idea of removing details to lead to the same results had not previously arison.

Tom Kelly confirmed the government felt Dr Kelly was a pawn to be used in the long running battle against the BBC. Mr Kelly admitted releasing certain details about Dr Kelly.

Day 22: Wednesday 25th September

Dr Kelly was informed that his name was to be released to the media in a 46-second telephone call. Bryan Wells, a senior MoD official, made the telephone call while travelling by train. His advice was for Dr Kelly to contact the press office and to be prepared to leave his house if neceassary. Dr Kelly and his wife, Janice, left the house within 10 minutes of hearing the press were on their way.

Gavin Davies, the BBC chairman, felt the BBC was under public obligation to fight the government.

The majority of information used for this report was adapted from:

Major Sources and Useful links:

http://www.the-hutton-inquiry.org.uk/

http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/in_depth/uk/2003/david_kelly_inquiry/default.stm

http://media.guardian.co.uk/iraqdossieraffair/

http://www.number-10.gov.uk/output/Page1.asp

http://www.itn.co.uk/