The two Iraq dossiers, which supposedly provided a valid foundation for the attack of Iraq, have been riddled with problems since there publication. From accusations of plagiarism too embellished information attempting to create the impression of a "rogue state", which is dangerous to the security of the world and must be dealt with immediately. The two dossiers, the first published in September, which proposed Iraq's capability of launching an attack within forty-five minutes. The second or the "dodgy dossier", published in February and partially plagiarised can be viewed here, or the conclusions and recommendations from the committee are here. All the background information can be found here.
The February document was discovered to contain information plagiarised from Ibrahim al-Marashi, an American student's thesis - a copy of which can be seen here. A response by the publisher of the plagiarised document can be found here, or an in depth comparison and report by the original discoverer, Cambridge University lecturer Glen Rangwala can be viewed here. The intelligence error did not clarify the difference between the source of information, with some from intelligence collected by the government and the rest adapted or 'borrowed' from publicly available sources - i.e. the Internet. Donald Rumsfeld has retracted his original argument and explained the US intelligence dossiers were made up of older intelligence, although viewed in the aftermath of the 9-11 attacks.
Tony Blair told the House of Commons that suggestions the document had been "doctored" were not true. Criticisms stemmed from the idea Blair deceived the British public in order to increase support for the war in Iraq. An investigation into the presentation of evidence will occur and another will follow by the parliamentary Intelligence and Security Committee.
Conflict between the BBC
and the government has escalated over this issue. This follows the BBC's
accusation and ultimate refusal to retract their claim the government dossier
was "sexed up" on Downing Street's request. One of the main arguments
derived from the claim that Saddam Hussein's regime could potentially launch
a strike with his Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) within forty-five minutes.
Problems arising following the end of the conflict include the lack of WMD surfacing,
the very justification for the attack. Therefore, as troops have been trying
to find these weapons throughout Iraq, their lack of success implies the ability
to launch within such a time limit was misleading. An Intelligence official
commented that this was not in the original copy of the dossier, but was added
only on Downing Street's request. The committee exonerated Alastair
Campbell for his part in the scandal.
Conflicting opinion exists as to the extent of the relevance of this ongoing debate between the government and BBC. Critics of the government propose this as an attempt to obscure the more pressing issues of the real reasons for war.
Norman Tebbit's article in the Independent defends the BBC's position. He believes the problem only stemmed from the failure of dealing with the situation of Iraq.
An Accusation by Phil Woolas against BBC reporter Andrew Gilligan has led to the latter's decision, with the support of the BBC, to sue. Although Alastair Campbell made similar claims about Mr Gilligan, he is covered under parliamentary privilege and therefore cannot be subject to legal action. Richard Sambrook, the BBC news chief, defended Mr Gilligan's methodology and use of sources for his report. Furthermore, Mr Sambrook implied Mr Campbell was launching a "personal vendetta" against the BBC and its reporters. This was contrasted by Mr Campbell's opinion of the fall of the BBC's standards. Ben Bradshaw, a former BBC reporter, now minister argued the guidelines had been compromised.
However, this has been compromised by a letter leaked to the Guardian, to the Commons foreign affairs select committee from Alastair Campbell advocating eleven changes to the Iraqi dossier prior to its publication. One suggested alteration was under commencement; with six of the remaining ten changed. Mr Campbell argues his proposed changes were minor in certain cases, but more significant in other areas of the document. A detailed comparison of the changes can be viewed in this article by The Guardian. However, it does appear the forty-five minute claim was first released in a joint intelligence committee report released a day before the first draft of the document was released, therefore defending Mr Campbell's position to an extent. One of the main arguments arising from this is that Alastair Campbell, a spin-doctor and un-elected official, is better known than many cabinet ministers. His position is only to respond to queries from the press, arrange press conferences and government announcements which although maintains his position in the public eye to an extent, does not justify his position.
During Prime Minister's questions, Charles Kennedy queried whether the Iraqi document was "sexed up". Mr Blair replied that the declaration was "totally untrue" and the government was assisting to the best of its ability with the committee. Robin Cook gave evidence that the report had "a selection of evidence to support the conclusion" that it had been "sexed up".
Alastair Campbell was cleared of the claim he "sexed up" the dossier by the chairperson's deciding vote. No minister was found to have mislead parliament regarding the contents of either dossier. A further problem stemmed from MPs request for John Scarlett, the chair of the Joint Intelligence Committee, to give evidence. This did not occur.
The main parts of the foreign affairs committee report follow. The report concluded the forty-five minute claim "did not warrant the prominence given to it" as it only came from one source. Furthermore, Alastair Campbell or special advisors should not chair such intelligence committees again. Another relevant factor was that the language used was more assertive than normal for intelligence documents. The second dossier was viewed as "counter-productive" and did not help the case for war.
Ananova comments that from the perspective of one of the members of the committee, the major problem is the quality of British intelligence rather than Alastair Campbell himself.
According to The
Guardian, the Ministry of Defence released the name of Dr David Kelly, to
enquire if he gave BBC reporter Andrew Gilligan information. Dr Kelly has admitted
to meeting Mr Gilligan, although whether he was the source still remains questionable.
Dr Kelly explained he thought the forty-five minute claim was probably included
"for impact". The BBC responded by refusing to release any details
explaining one of the key journalistic ideals was to protect sources at all
costs, regardless of pressure applied.
Sir Jeremy Greenstone, the British Ambassador to the UN, explains his belief that with time, all the information will be released. He is adamant that with the information being transported quickly, relevant areas were "being buried". He discusses the "Niger connection" and a further suggestion Iraq had tried to acquire uranium enrichment "yellow cake" from a West African country. This evidence turned out to be fake, although it did not come solely from British intelligence. However, Sir Jeremy believes Iraq did attempt to acquire such materials in the 1980s and probably since 1999, with evidence existing to reaffirm this which is entirely separate from the faked documents.
During the State of the Union speech, Bush said British information confirmed Iraq's efforts to acquire uranium from Niger. However, the document was forged and the CIA allegedly informed the Bush government this was untrue. Doubts over the reliability of US intelligence have been raised.
The argument that Iraq would rather hide or destroy WMD rather than use them is ridiculous. The BBC reports that with more time, the weapons inspectors may have been able to complete their job without the necessity of war. Robin Cook pointed out that if the weapons had not been found yet, surely parliament's senior officials must now be concerned the weapons were sold to terror groups and may be en route to the UK as we speak. Tony Blair continues to be adamant that WMD will turn up.
An article written by Mr Cook in The Independent examined the situation. Mr Cook argued that Hans Blix, the Chief Weapons Inspector, asked for a few more months. However, Tony Blair said the threat to Britain was a "real and present danger". If this is true then where are the weapons now? The forty-five minute claim in itself is proving more ridiculous, with the months passing without any sign. Furthermore, Mr Cook points out that without WMD there is no justification for war. He believes the focus for war will shift from WMD to disarmament to validate the war.
Where does this situation leave the government? Bush said the war was to "to disarm Iraq, to free its people and to defend the world from grave danger." War would be legal through either multilateral action via the UN or if there was a credible threat and therefore justified self-defence. However, if there were no WMD and these non-existing WMD were not available to be used within the suggested forty-five minutes, then the coalition of the willing had no right to attack Iraq. Especially if the primary reason was actually regime change as this would violate international law. Therefore, without the threat and imminent danger posed by Iraq, war was arguably illegal. Consequently, is the government fit to continue ruling if they misled, misinformed and acted in an illegitimate manner?
(This report was written by James Neely who is helping Scottish CND with research work, it does not necessarily reflect the policy of Scottish CND)