Wednesday, November 10, 1999 10:23 AM
Subject: New Agenda Vote
Notes from Sharon Riggle in NY
Here is the partial and unabridged version of today's debate on the New Agenda resolution. I apologise for its length -- but I am trying to give you as much of the information I have as possible. There are a few explanations of vote missing, but they will come to you tomorrow. I will follow later with a more analytical perspective.
The vote was taken this morning and it was:
90 -Yes
13 - No
37 - Abstention
While we did not have the sweep of Yes votes that we were hoping for, there were a few interesting small changes. Of note was that Turkey joined many of its NATO colleagues this year in an abstention, when last year they voted No. As well Lithuania moved from a No to an abstention this year, as did Latvia, Slovakia, and Czech Republic. Algeria moved from abstention to a Yes. For the rest, I don't have the voting record from last year in front of me, but you can look that up if you have it and compare it to the list below. The final number of co-sponsors was over 60 (although only 57 are listed below). See full text of sponsors and final resolution below.
The debate over the NAC was the longest one so far, with many countries taking the floor both before and after the voting. Before the vote, the UK, Argentina, France and Cuba took the floor to explain their positions.
The UK started by welcoming the willingness of the NAC to engage with states and incorporate their views into the text where possible. They reiterated that their commitment to nuclear disarmament and Article 6 of the NPT is clear, and was manifested in the Strategic Defence Review last year. They share the frustration over slow progress. A faster bilateral process between the US and Russia is needed, especially ratification of the CTBT. They are impatient to begin negotiations on a fissile materials cutoff treaty in the Geneva Conference on Disarmament. They recognise that there is support in the NAC resolution for all these measures. A range of measures that go beyond the Principles and Objectives document agreed in 1995 will not forward progress, because there is no consensus. They do not like the reference to de-mating of warheads from delivery vehicles, as it is incompatible with a 'credible minimum deterrent'.
Argentina stated that it shared the objectives of the international community on the goals of the resolution. Unfortunately, there are several elements that they don't like (which they didn't name). They hope in the future that the resolution will be changed to be more acceptable to a larger number of countries. They announced their abstention.
France gave an especially heated appeal and denounced many of the measures in the resolution. (I have a hard copy in French which I will not be able to get to anyone very soon, unfortunately). They acknowledged the improvements from last year's text, and classified some goals as realistic and others as not. They consider the overall approach as 'dangerous'. Why do we need a'new' agenda? they asked. They advocate the agenda set out in 1995 in the Principles and Objectives' Programme of Action (see previous Update for background on this particular argument). If the 1995 list is outdated, 'they should say so clearly'. They feel the contradictions are obvious, unless the NAC is 'masking ulterior motives'. They have special problems with the call for a reconsideration of policies and doctrines -- when the UN Charter clearly states the right to self-defence, and their nuclear policy already embraces the lowest possible sufficiency. They also don't understand why an international conference is necessary, especially since the P5 are against it. The see the NPT RevCon as the appropriate forum. They don't think they should sign on just to 'satisfy the pride of some' or because it happens to be the fashion. The NAC seems to have a policy of 'constructive ambiguity'.
Cuba said that the language used does not reflect their traditional positions, but emphasises that a 'new agenda' has merit and they commend it. The NAC, in concert with the other initiatives, contributes to nuclear disarmament. They wanted a vote on the paragraphs that mentioned the universality of the NPT, as they are not members because they view it as discriminatory and selective that perpetuates two classes of states.
After the voting, China, Belgium, India, the United States, Japan, Turkey, Syria, South Korea, Australia, Poland, Mauritius and Canada all took the floor for an explanation of vote. China started out as usual by saying how sincerely they embraced nuclear disarmament. They support the goals and principles of the New Agenda resolution regarding a nuclear-weapon-free world, as well as some of the specific steps, such as the revision of nuclear doctrines, legally-binding NSAs, strengthened NPT and its universality and nuclear-weapon-free zones. However as preconditions for action they view the preservation of the
ABM treaty as key, as well as stopping the proliferation of missiles and missile technology. They do not like de-alerting or de-mating, fissile materials cutoff treaty and inventories -- both of which could only happen in an environment conducive to negotiations and should be linked to nuclear disarmament. It also fails to urge the NWS to declare a no first use policy or a commitment to the non-use or threat of use policy.
Belgium spoke on behalf of several countries, including many NATO/EU/central European countries, and welcomed the NAC commitment to nuclear disarmament, with the ultimate goal of a nuclear weapon free world. A gradual process is needed. The CTBT's lack of entry into force, might 'seriously hinder' progress, as well as differences over the ABM treaty. They expressed concern over certain recent developments and acknowledged that momentum is needed to revitalise the process, but the answer is not new institutions or mechanisms. They recognised that the sponsors have altered the text to accommodate the concerns of many states. The NPT is their highest priority and firmly believe that this is where progress should be sought. The Principles and Objectives are central. Setbacks to this process should be overcome. The bilateral process has shown important results, but there has been no progress in recent years, and they urged progress in the START process. They 'regretted' the US Senate vote on CTBT, but welcomed Clinton's statement of support for the treaty and continued moratorium. The FMCT should be negotiated in the CD without delay. And the proposal put forward by the 'NATO 5' should be considered, laying the groundwork for discussions on nuclear disarmament. There is a shared responsibility for progress on nuclear disarmament. They will judge states by their actions and not on declarations. A successful Review Conference in 2000 and negotiations on FMCT are how they will judge.
India understood that the genesis of the resolution was the June 1998 statement of the eight nations, which they welcomed. The resolution goes far beyond that. The only consensus document has been the SSOD1 in 1978 which set forth the Programme of Action, which has much unfinished business and should serve as the basis for future work. They have problems with the paragraphs that mention the NPT and call for its universality. The resolution also has extranneous elements and language from other fora. Also they do not like the references to 'nuclear-weapons-capable' states when they see themselves already there. The NWFZone reference also ignores the key aspect of having the arrangements 'freely arrived at' by the states of the region. There is also no mention of no first use. NATO's security is predicated on the use of nuclear deterrence and that undermines security. The resolution ignores the efforts in some countries to modify and refine existing nuclear weapons. The ABM dispute erodes the positive climate for change. Support for the NPT attempts to 'revive the sagging fortunes' of a treaty that has lost credibility, and mistakenly put its faith in the promises of the 'self-annointed' nuclear-weapon states. The New Agenda cannot succeed in the 'old framework' of the NPT.
The United States, while respecting the motivations of the resolution, does not accept the fundamental premise that we need a 'new' agenda. We already have one, even if the pace is frustratingly slow. The only way is practical, incremental steps that take into account the international environment. The resolution will not invigorate the sitaution. In OP1 it calls for the NWS to make undertakings -- but the US already has in the NPT, so what good would another do? The international conference is unnecessary as there are already too many fora and another won't speed progress. The current agenda is full enough, and the resolution embraces most of it. But what would invigorate the situation is FMCT discussions in the CD.
Japan, Algeria, Syria, South Korea, Australia, Poland, Mauritius and Canada will come tomorrow, as there is not time to add it to this email.
VOTING ON RESOLUTION AS A WHOLE
Yes: (90)
Algeria, Angola, Austria, Bahamas, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Barbados, Belarus,
Benin, Bolivia, Botswana, Brazil, Brunei dar-Salam, Burkina Faso, Cambodia,
Cape Verde, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Cote d'Ivoire, Croatia, Cuba
Cyprus, Djibouti, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Egypt, Eritrea, Ethiopia,
Ghana, Guatemala, Guinea, Guyana, Haiti, Indonesia, Iran, Ireland, Jamaica,
Kenya, Kuwait, Laos, Lebanon, Libya, Liechtenstein, Madagascar, Malaysia,
Maldives, Mali, Malta, Mexico, Mongolia, Morocco, Mozambique, Namibia,
Nepal, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Nigeria, Oman, Panama, Papua New Guinea,
Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Qatar, San Marino, Saudi Arabia, Senegal,
Sierra Leone, Singapore, Solomon Islands, South Africa, Sri Lanka, Sudan,
Swaziland, Sweden, Syria, Thailand, Togo, Trinidad-Tobago, Tunisia, Uganda,
United Arab Emirates, Uruguay, Venezuela, Viet Nam, Yemen, Zambia
No: (13)
Bulgaria, Estonia, France, Hungary, India, Israel, Monaco, Pakistan, Poland,
Romania, Russian Federation, United Kingdom, United States
Abstention: (37)
Andorra, Argentina, Armenia, Australia, Azerbaijan, Belgium, Bhutan,
Bosnia/Herzegovina, Canada, China, Czech Republic, Denmark, Finland,
Georgia, Germany, Greece, Iceland, Italy, Japan, Kazakhstan, Latvia,
Lithuania, Luxembourg, Mauritius, Myanmar, Netherlands, Norway, Portugal,
Republic of Korea, Republic of Moldova, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, FYR
Macedonia, Turkey, Ukraine, Uzbekistan
VOTING ON OPERATIVE PARAGRAPH 7:
'OP7 Calls upon those States that have not yet done so to adhere unconditionally and without delay to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and to take all the necessary measures which flow from adherence to this instrument as non-nuclear weapon States;'
Yes - 128,
No - 3,
Abstention - 3
Yes:
Algeria, Andorra, Angola, Argentina, Armenia, Australia, Austria,
Azerbaijan, Bahamas, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Barbados, Belarus, Belgium, Benin,
Bolivia, Bosnia/Herzegovina, Botswana, Brazil, Brunei dar-Salam, Bulgaria,
Burkina Faso, Cambodia, Canada, Cape Verde, Chile, China, Colombia, Costa
Rica, Cote d'Ivoire, Croatia, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, Djibouti,
Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Egypt, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Finland, Georgia,
Germany, Ghana, Greece, Guatemala, Guinea, Guyana, Haiti, Hungary, Iceland,
Indonesia, Iran, Ireland, Jamaica, Japan, Jordan, Kazakhstan, Kenya, Kuwait,
Laos, Lebanon, Libya, Liechtenstein, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Macedonia (FYR
of), Madagascar, Malaysia, Maldives, Mali, Malta, Mauritius, Mexico,
Moldova, Mongolia, Morocco, Mozambique, Myanmar, Namibia, Nepal,
Netherlands, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Nigeria, Norway, Oman, Panama, Papua
New Guinea, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Portugal, Qatar, Republic
of Korea, Romania, San Marino, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Sierra Leone,
Singapore, Slovakia, Slovenia, Solomon Islands, South Africa, Spain, Sri
Lanka, Sudan, Swaziland, Sweden, Syria, Tanzania (U.R. of), Thailand, Togo,
Trinidad-Tobago, Tunisia, Turkey, Turkmenistan, Uganda, Ukraine, United Arab
Emirates, Uruguay, Venezuela, VietNam, Yemen, Zambia
No:
India, Israel, Pakistan
Abstain:
Bhutan, Cuba, Latvia
VOTING ON OPERATIVE PARAGRAPH 18
'OP18 Calls for the conclusion of an internationally legally-binding instrument to effectively assure non-nuclear-weapon States parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons;'
Yes - 128,
No - 0,
Abstention - 5
Yes:
Algeria, Andorra, Angola, Argentina, Armenia, Austria, Azerbaijan, Bahamas,
Bahrain, Bangladesh, Barbados, Belarus, Belgium, Benin, Bhutan, Bolivia,
Bosnia/Herzegovina, Botswana, Brazil, Brunei dar-Salam, Bulgaria, Burkina
Faso, Cambodia, Canada, Cape Verde, Chile, China, Colombia, Costa Rica, Cote
d'Ivoire, Croatia, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, Djibouti, Dominican
Republic, Ecuador, Egypt, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Finland, Georgia, Germany,
Ghana, Greece, Guatemala, Guinea, Guyana, Haiti, Hungary, Iceland,
Indonesia, Iran, Ireland, Italy, Jamaica, Japan, Jordan, Kazakhstan, Kenya,
Kuwait, Laos, Latvia, Lebanon, Libya, Liechtenstein, Lithuania, Luxembourg,
Macedonia (FYR of), Madagascar, Malaysia, Maldives, Mali, Malta, Mauritius,
Mexico, Moldova, Mongolia, Morocco, Mozambique, Myanmar, Namibia, Nepal,
Netherlands, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Nigeria, Norway, Oman, Panama, Papua
New Guinea, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Portugal, Qatar, Romania,
San Marino, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Singapore, Slovakia,
Slovenia, Solomon Islands, South Africa, Spain, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Swaziland,
Sweden, Syria, Tanzania (U.R. of), Thailand, Togo, Trinidad-Tobago, Tunisia,
Turkey, Turkmenistan, Uganda, Ukraine, United Arab Emirates, Uruguay,
Uzbekistan, Venezuela, VietNam, Yemen, Zambia
No:
--
Abstain:
Cuba, India, Israel, Pakistan, Republic of Korea
UNGA54 Resolution A/C.1/54/L.18 [Final Version]
'Towards a nuclear-weapon-free world: the need for a new agenda'
Co-sponsors: Angola, Benin, Bolivia, Botswana, Brazil, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cameroon, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Cote d'Ivoire, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Egypt, El Salvador, Fiji, Ghana, Grenada, Guatemala, Guyana, Haiti, Honduras, Ireland, Jamaica, Kenya, Lesotho, Liberia, Madagascar, Malaysia, Mali, Mexico, Mozambique, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Niger, Nigeria, Panama, Papua New Guinea, Peru, Philippines, Samoa, San Marino, Saudi Arabia, Sierra Leone, Solomon Islands, South Africa, Swaziland, Sweden, Thailand, Togo, Uganda, Uruguay, Venezuela, Viet Nam, Zambia and Zimbabwe
The General Assembly,
PPI Convinced that the existence of nuclear weapons is a threat to the survival of humanity,
PP2 Concerned at the prospect of the indefinite possession of nuclear weapons, believing that the contention that nuclear weapons can be retained in perpetuity and never used is not supported by the history of human experience, and convinced that the only complete defence is the elimination of nuclear weapons and the assurance that they will never be produced again,
PP3 Concerned also at the continued retention of the nuclear-weapons option by those three States that are nuclear-weapon-capable and that have not acceded to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, and concerned at their failure to renounce that option,
PP4 Concerned further that negotiations on nuclear arms reductions are currently stalled,
PP5 Bearing in mind that the overwhelming majority of States entered into legally binding commitments not to receive, manufacture or otherwise acquire nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices, and recalling that these undertakings have been made in the context of the corresponding legally binding commitments by the Nuclear-Weapon States to the pursuit of nuclear disarmament,
PP6 Recalling the unanimous conclusion of the International Court of Justice in its 1996 advisory opinion that there exists an obligation to pursue in good faith and bring to a conclusion negotiations leading to nuclear disarmament in all its aspects under strict and effective international control,
PP7 Stressing that the international community must not enter the new millennium with the prospect that the possession of nuclear weapons will be considered legitimate for the indefinite future, and convinced of the imperative to proceed with determination to prohibit and eradicate them for all time, PP8 Recognizing that the total elimination of nuclear weapons will require measures to be taken firstly by those Nuclear-Weapon States that have the largest arsenals, and stressing that these States must be joined in a seamless process by those Nuclear-Weapon States with lesser arsenals in the near future,
PP9 Welcoming the achievements to date and the future promise of the Strategic Arms Reduction Talks process and the possibility it offers for development as a plurilateral mechanism including all the Nuclear-Weapon States, for the practical dismantling and destruction of nuclear armaments undertaken in pursuit of the elimination of nuclear weapons,
PP10 Welcoming also the Trilateral Initiative between the United States of America, the Russian Federation and the International Atomic Energy Agency to ensure the irreversible removal of fissile materials from weapons programmes,
PP11 Believing that there area number of practical steps that the Nuclear-Weapon States can and should take immediately before the actual elimination of nuclear arsenals and the development of requisite verification regimes take place and, in this connection, noting certain recent unilateral and other steps,
PP12 Underlining that the ABM Treaty remains a cornerstone of strategic stability,
PP13 Stressing that each article of the NPT is binding on the respective States parties at all times and in all circumstances,
PP14 Stressing the importance of pursuing negotiations in the Conference on Disarmament in the Ad Hoc Committee established under item I of its agenda entitled "Cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament", on the basis of the report of the Special Coordinator and the mandate contained therein, on a non-discriminatory, multilateral and internationally and effectively verifiable treaty banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices, and considering that such a treaty must further underpin the process towards the total elimination of nuclear weapons,
PP 15 Emphasizing that, for the total elimination of nuclear weapons to be achieved, effective international cooperation to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons is vital and must be enhanced through, inter alia, the extension of international controls over all fissile material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices,
PP16 Emphasizing the importance of existing nuclear-weapon-free zone treaties and of the early signature and ratification of the relevant protocols to these treaties,
PP 17 Noting the Joint Ministerial Declaration of 9 June 1998 and its call for a new international agenda to achieve a nuclear-weapon-free world, through the pursuit, in parallel, of a series of mutually reinforcing measures at the bilateral, plurilateral and multilateral levels,
PP18 Acknowledging the Report of the Secretary-General of 21 September 1999 on the implementation of General Assembly resolution 53/77 Y of 4 December 1998,
PP19 Taking note of the first Report of the Director General of the International Atomic Energy Agency on the Agency's exploration of verification arrangements that will be necessary for the maintenance of a world free of nuclear weapons,
OP1 Calls upon the Nuclear-Weapon States to make an unequivocal undertaking to accomplish the speedy and total elimination of their nuclear arsenals and to engage without delay in an accelerated process of negotiations, thus achieving nuclear disarmament, to which they are committed under Article VI of the NPT;
OP2 Calls upon the United States of America and the Russian Federation to bring the Treaty on Further Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms (START II) into force without further delay and to commence negotiations on START III with a view to its early conclusion;
OP3 Calls upon the Nuclear-Weapon States to undertake the necessary steps towards the seamless integration of all five Nuclear-Weapon States into the process leading to the total elimination of nuclear weapons;
OP4 Calls for the examination of ways and means to diminish the role of nuclear weapons in security policies so as to enhance strategic stability, facilitate the process of the elimination of these weapons and contribute to international confidence and security;
OP5 Calls upon the Nuclear-Weapon States, in this context, to take early steps:
- To reduce tactical nuclear weapons with a view to their elimination as an integral part of nuclear arms reductions;
- To examine the possibilities for and to proceed to the de-alerting and removal of nuclear warheads from delivery vehicles;
- To further examine nuclear weapons policies and postures;
- To demonstrate transparency on their nuclear arsenals and fissile material inventories; and,
- To place all fissile material for nuclear weapons declared to be in excess of military requirements under International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards in the framework of the voluntary safeguards agreements in place; OP6 Calls upon those three States that are nuclear-weapons-capable and that have not yet acceded to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons to reverse clearly and urgently the pursuit of all nuclear weapons development or deployment and to refrain from any action which could undermine regional and international peace and security and the efforts of the international community towards nuclear disarmament and the prevention of nuclear weapons proliferation;
OP7 Calls upon those States that have not yet done so to adhere unconditionally and without delay to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and to take all the necessary measures which flow from adherence to this instrument as non-nuclear weapon States;
OP8 Also calls upon those States that have not yet done so to conclude full-scope safeguards agreements with the International Atomic Energy Agency and to conclude additional protocols to their safeguards agreements on the basis of the Model Protocol approved by the Board of Governors of the Agency on 15 May 1997;
OP9 Further calls upon those States that have not yet done so to sign and ratify, unconditionally and without delay, the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty and, pending the entry into force of the Treaty, to observe a moratorium on nuclear tests;
OP10 Calls upon those States that have not yet done so to adhere to the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material and to work towards its further strengthening;
OP11 Urges the development of the Trilateral Initiative between the United States of America, the Russian Federation and the International Atomic Energy Agency and urges that similar arrangements be developed by the other Nuclear-Weapon States;
OP12 Calls upon the Conference on Disarmament to re-establish the Ad Hoc Committee under item 1 of its agenda entitled "Cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament", on the basis of the report of the Special Coordinator and the mandate contained therein, of a non-discriminatory, multilateral and internationally and effectively verifiable treaty banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices, taking into consideration both nuclear non-proliferation and nuclear disarmament objectives, and to pursue and conclude these negotiations without delay, and, pending the entry into force of the treaty, urges all States to observe a moratorium on the production of fissile materials for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices;
OP13 Also calls upon the Conference on Disarmament to establish an appropriate subsidiary body to deal with nuclear disarmament and, to that end, to pursue as a matter of priority its intensive consultations on appropriate methods and approaches with a view to reaching such a decision without delay;
OP14 Considers that an international conference on nuclear disarmament and nuclear non-proliferation, which would effectively complement efforts being undertaken in other settings, could facilitate the consolidation of a new agenda for a nuclear-weapon-free world;
OP15 Notes, in this context, that the Millennium Summit in 2000 will consider peace, security and disarmament;
OP16 Stresses the importance of the full implementation of the decisions and resolution adopted at the 1995 Review and Extension Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, and, in this connection, underlines the significance of the forthcoming Review Conference of the States Parties to the NPT in April/May 2000;
OP17 Affirms that the development of verification arrangements will be necessary for the maintenance of a world free from nuclear weapons, and requests the International Atomic Energy Agency, together with any other relevant international organizations and bodies, to continue to explore the elements of such a system;
OP18 Calls for the conclusion of an internationally legally binding instrument to effectively assure non-nuclear-weapon States parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons;
OP19 Stresses that the pursuit, extension and establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones, on the basis of arrangements freely arrived at, especially in regions of tension, such as the Middle East and South Asia, represent a significant contribution to the goal of a nuclear-weapon-free world;
OP20 Affirms that a nuclear-weapon-free world will ultimately require the underpinnings of a universal and multilaterally negotiated legally binding instrument or a framework encompassing a mutually reinforcing set of instruments;
OP21 Requests the Secretary-General, within existing resources, to compile a report on the implementation of the present resolution;
OP22 Decides to include in the provisional agenda of its fifty-fifth session an item entitled "Towards a nuclear-weapon-free world: the need for a new agenda", and to review the implementation of the present resolution.